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Abstract 
 
Licensing entails a tradeoff: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) have to 
be balanced against the lower price-cost margin and/or reduced market share that the increased 
competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee implies. We argue that the presence of 
multiple technology holders, who compete in the market for technology, changes such tradeoff 
and triggers a more aggressive licensing behavior.  To test our theory we analyze technology 
licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986-96. We find that the rate of licensing is 
initially increasing and then decreasing in the number of potential technology suppliers, 
negatively related to the licensor’s market share and to the degree of product differentiation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The last decade of the 20th century has witnessed an unprecedented growth in a variety of arrangements 
for the exchange of technologies or technological services (Rivette and Kline, 1999; Rigby and Zook, 
2002). Certain technology-based sectors, including biopharmaceutics, software, semiconductors and 
telecommunications, have made the licensing of intellectual property a way of life (Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella, 2001). 
It is not surprising that small technology-based firms license. Lacking the downstream manufacturing and 
marketing capabilities, they have no other means to appropriate the rents from innovation. More 
surprising is that large established producers are actively promoting licensing-based strategy. Firms such 
as Union Carbide, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, Boeing, Hoechst, IBM, Texas Instruments, AT&T, and 
Phillips Petroleum are now explicitly considering licensing revenues as a part of the overall return from 
investing in technology (Rivette and Kline, 1999).1 These firms are well established, have large market 
shares in the product markets, and are capable of exploiting the technology on their own. Interesting 
enough, many of such companies have created specific web pages to advertise and sell their technologies 
(Arora et al., 2001).  
This paper examines the licensing strategies of large firms by focusing on some of the determinants of 
their rate of licensing. In particular, we aim at shedding light on the role played by competition in the 
market for technology to shape firms’ licensing decisions. We argue that firms’ rate of licensing can be 
explained by the interplay of two effects that licensing generates on the licensor’s profits: the profit 
dissipation effect and the revenue effect. Indeed, licensing forces a trade-off: Licensing and royalty 
revenues net of transaction costs (the revenue effect) have to be balanced against the lower price-cost 
margin and/or reduced market share that the increased competition (the profit dissipation effect) from the 
licensee implies (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). The presence of multiple technology holders, who compete in 
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the market for technology, changes such tradeoff and triggers a more aggressive licensing behavior. We 
then focus on two other potentially important determinants of firms’ rate of licensing: the licensor’s 
market share in the product market, and the degree of product differentiation. 
We test our theory on a sample of large chemical firms that possess technological competencies in a set of 
more than 100 chemical products. We look at their licensing strategies over the period 1986-1996. The 
chemical industry has a long tradition of technology licensing (Arora, 1997). This allows us to count on 
reliable data. In addition, as we highlight in the next section, there are often several technologies available 
from different licensors to produce the same chemical product, which helps us underscore the effect of 
competition in the market for technology. For instance, there is an established market for polyolefins 
production processes with about 25 different polyethylene technologies available and eight for 
polypropylene. Large established chemical producers like Dow Chemicals, BP-Amoco, Exxon-Mobil, 
Union Carbide, Univation and Basell, along with independent technology suppliers like Novolen and 
Engelhard, compete face to face in the licensing market (Tullo, 2003).  
After controlling for different other sources of variation, our results suggest that firms license more 
actively their technology when there are competing technologies available in the market, when they have 
a tiny market share and when the downstream product is relatively homogenous.  
This research contributes to several branches of the licensing literature. First, it develops a very 
simple, but powerful framework to analyze firms’ licensing decisions. It goes behind the 
standard transaction costs theory used in the management literature to explain why licensing is 
chosen or not for a given transaction (Williamson, 1991; Teece, 1986; Teece, 1988). We follow 
here an approach that considers the impact of licensing on the whole value chain of the licensor 
rather than narrowly focusing on economizing on each single transaction. Needless to say that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 The exact magnitude of the phenomenon is difficult to assess. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it 
already involves large sums of money. Both Dow Chemicals and DuPont, two firms with a long tradition 
of exploiting their technology in-house, are expected to have licensing revenues above $100 million per 
year. In 1998 IBM patent licensing revenues accounted for 10% of IBM’s net profits. Union Carbide is 
reported to earn more than $300 million from its polyolefin licensing in a single year (Arora et al., 2001). 
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transaction costs considerations are still important in shaping firms’ licensing strategy. Hence, 
our approach complements rather than substitutes the extant transaction costs theory.  
Second, this paper adds to the economic literature that has investigated several strategic rationales behind 
firms’ licensing decisions.   For instance, licensing can be used strategically to control competition and 
limit entry. Gallini (1984) has argued that an incumbent firm may license its production technology to 
reduce the incentive of a potential entrant to develop its own, possibly better, technology. Alternatively, 
the incumbent firm might license a weak rival to crowd the market and deter entry by a stronger 
competitor (Rockett, 1990). Licensing can also be used to make performance or price commitments that 
otherwise would not be credible (Farrell and Gallini, 1988).  In this paper we show that an important and 
yet little understood determinant of licensing is competition in the market for technology. This also 
suggests that the standard assumption made in the economic literature of a monopolist technology holder 
might sometimes be implausible.  
Third, and most important, this work contributes to the relatively underdeveloped empirical research on 
licensing. This lacuna is understandable. In many industries licensing is a very recent phenomenon, so 
available data are scattered. In addition, firms tend to conceal information about licensing deals, which is 
typically considered strategic and not publicly disclosed.  
Anand and Khanna (2000) provide one of the few econometric investigations of the rate of licensing. 
Their study is however aggregated at the level of the sector, and they do not attempt to explain inter-firm 
differences in the rate of licensing. Kim and Vonortas (2003), using a similar theoretical approach, 
investigate firms’ characteristics that explain the probability that two companies engage in a licensing 
agreement. They do not look however at the interaction between licensing decisions and competition in 
the market for technology which is crucial in this paper. Recently, several scholars have directed their 
attention to the analysis of licensing practices by universities (Mowery and Shane, 2002). For, instance 
Sine, Shane and Di Gregorio (2003) have shown that the rate of licensing by universities is an increasing 
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function of their prestige. However, university licensing decisions are much different from those made by 
large firms, if anything because universities do not have stakes in the product market.  
Other empirical research on technology transfer has focused on the factors that determine the choices 
firms make between various organizational forms (e.g. Teece, 1986; Hill, 1992). For instance, Gans, Hsu 
and Stern (2002) study the determinants of commercialization strategy for start-up innovators. Within this 
tradition, the empirical literature has especially looked at the entry choice in foreign markets (e.g. Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990). None of these studies looked at the factors underpinning 
firms’ rate of licensing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses licensing dynamics in 
three chemical products and motivates our interest in the role played by competition in the market for 
technology. Section 3 develops our  theoretical framework to explain firms’ rate of licensing and 
formulates some testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology and our data. 
Section 5 discusses the results, whereas section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. TECHNOLOGY LICENSING IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
Technology licensing in the chemical industry has a very long tradition. Cross-licensing agreements were 
already used at the beginning of the 20th century as a means to maintain market shares and deter entry in 
an international chemical market characterized by the presence of strong cartels  (see, e.g., Spitz, 1988).  It 
is, however, only after world war II that firms started to use licensing as a means to profit from innovation 
and a market for chemical technology begun to arise.  Indeed, starting from the 1950s an increasing 
number of chemical processes became available for license (Arora, 1997). In this section, we briefly 
describe licensing dynamics in three chemical markets.2 We aim to highlight the role played by 
competition in the technology market in shaping firms’ licensing strategies. 
                                                          
2 These three short case studies have been constructed using information assembled from a variety of 
sources, most notably specialized chemical journals, business press, and the Internet. 
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Acrylic acid. Acrylic acid is one of the most widespread chemical compounds, key input of many 
products we use in our everyday life.3 Acrylic acid was first prepared in 1843, however it was not 
produced commercially until the late 1920s, and only in the early 1950s started to have a major use. 
Several processes – acetylene-based, acrylonitrile hydrolysis, ketene process, ethylene cyanohydrin 
process, have been employed to produce acrylic acid before the actually standard technology, based on 
propylene oxidation, was developed by the Japanese chemical firm Nippon Shokubai in the 70s. Till the 
mid 80s Nippon Shokubai licensed its technology, which was also available through another Japanese 
firm, Mitsubishi Chemicals. Other technology holders, like the German giant BASF, were much more 
restrictive in offering their technology to potential licensees. Recently, as all the potential licensors are 
also producers and have strong interest in maintaining market stability, the attitude toward licensing even 
of the early licensors, Nippon Shokubai and Mitsubishi Chemicals, has become very conservative. A kind 
of tacit collusion in the market for technology seems to be in place nowadays. Firms avoid direct 
competition in the licensing business, which is likely to be destructive for all players. Most of the 
licensing is directed to markets with strong growth potential that could not be reached otherwise. 
Although pressure towards an aggressive licensing behavior exists because of the potential competition in 
the market for technology, all licensors are also big producers that hold symmetric stakes in the acrylic 
acid market and that would suffer almost equally the consequences of a licensing war. 
Ethylene glycol. Ethylene glycol is a clear, colorless, odorless, viscous liquid with a sweet taste, that can 
produce dramatic toxicity. It is found most commonly in antifreeze, automotive cooling systems, and 
hydraulic brake fluids. In an industrial setting it is used as a solvent or as the raw material for a variety of 
processes.  
Ethylene glycol was first prepared in 1856, but it is only around the 1920s that the American firm Union 
Carbide started its commercial production. The currently dominant technology for producing ethylene 
                                                          
3 Approximately two thirds of the acrylic acid manufactured in the US is used to produce acrylic esters 
that, when polymerized, are ingredients in paints, coatings, textiles, adhesives, plastics, and many other 
applications. The remaining one third of the acrylic acid is used to produce polyacrylic acid, or cross-
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oxide through the direct oxidation of ethylene was developed by a French firm at the beginning of the 
1930s and subsequently perfected by Union Carbide. At the end of the 1940s other two companies 
developed alternative technologies for the production of ethylene glycol based on the oxidation of 
ethylene, the engineering firm Scientific Design and the chemical giant Shell.  Other firms like Dow 
Chemicals and DuPont used different technologies that have been later abandoned either because 
economically unviable or because of environmental concerns. 
Union Carbide, which is the largest producer in the world used its own process captively and did not 
license it out. Scientific Design, who did not have a stake in the final market for ethylene glycol, licensed 
its process aggressively, and have now the largest share of built capacity. The other major player, Shell, 
both used and licensed its own process. Recently, Union Carbide too has started to license its technology 
although very selectively. It is important to emphasize here the role played by a firm, source of the 
technology, but not an active producer of the final product. Scientific Design was not inhibited in its 
licensing efforts by concerns over its production position and potential competition from new players. 
This has sparked a more proactive licensing behavior by the other two major players that would have 
been otherwise much more concerned about the potential threat created to their market shares. As a 
consequence, the industry structure of the ethylene glycol market is highly fragmented with many players 
and strong competition in any region of the world.  
Metallocene. Metallocenes (more accurately, “single site catalysts”) are a new type of catalyst system for 
polymers that provide much greater control over molecular size and architecture than previously possible. 
Hence, the physical properties of the plastic can be tailored more finely. Key applications for 
metallocene-based polymers include pharmaceutical and medical packaging, capacitor films, flexible food 
packaging, optical parts and lenses, and toner binder resins.  
The technology is still new and diffusing. Metallocene technology has been commercialized in 
polyethylene, but it is still in its early stages in polypropylene. Integrating the new catalyst with an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
linked polyacrylic acid compounds, which have been successfully used in the manufacture of hygienic 
products, detergents, and waste water treatment chemicals. 
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established process technology has been a major technical challenge in the development of the 
technology. Demand for global polyethylene in the year 2010 is estimated to be about 83 million tons, of 
which metallocenes represent about 17 million tons, or about 20%. 
Dow Chemicals and Exxon, the leaders in metallocene technology for polyethylene, are also leading 
producers of polyethylene.   Both are also leading technology suppliers, licensing their technology on a 
worldwide basis in cooperation with other prominent firms (BP Chemicals and Union Carbide, 
respectively) who possess important complementary technologies, notably gas phase process technology 
for polyethylene.4  
Beside these two main groups, other firms are also very active in the market for polymers and have 
invested heavily to develop their own metallocene technology. Although still followers, companies like 
BASF, Hoechst, Mitsui Toatsu, Fina, Nova and DuPont are reported to have already announced their 
intention to pursue an active licensing strategy as soon as they will perfect their technology. A strong 
licensing war seems to be the most likely scenario in the market of metallocene catalysts, where there are 
at least half a dozen potential sources of the technology. 
 
3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
A licensing contract is the less integrated, more market-based alternative available to firms for profiting 
from their innovation. Indeed, licensing positions itself at the extreme of a continuum of governance 
structures ranging from a market mechanism to hierarchy, i.e. in-house exploitation of the innovation 
(Williamson, 1991).  
The standard framework to analyze licensing decisions is provided by the transaction costs theory. This 
approach suggests that, absent significant contracting hazards, an arm’s length contract such as licensing 
                                                          
4 In 1997, Exxon and Union Carbide created the joint-venture, Univation Technologies, with the aim to 
license polyethylene process technology. Exxon provided its Exxpol metallocene catalyst technology and 
Union Carbide provided its Unipol single reactor gas phase technology and expertise in the technology 
licensing business. Dow negotiated a joint development with BP shortly before the creation of Univation. 
Dow provided its metallocene catalyst technology (Insite system), whereas BP offered its gas phase 
technology as well as its licensing expertise. 
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would be the most direct way to capture the profit from the intellectual asset (such as a process or an idea) 
a firm holds.  However, writing and executing a reliable contract for the use of technology requires 
adequate specification of property rights, monitoring and enforcement of contractual terms – any of which 
may be problematic. Teece (1988) identifies three major sources of transaction costs in technology 
transfer. First, it is hard to provide detailed specifications about the characteristics of the technology at the 
beginning of the transaction, implying that contracts are largely incomplete and potentially leave either 
party open to opportunistic behavior by the other. Second, most of the times the transfer of technology 
forces the licensee to develop tight interactions with the technology supplier. The interplay of 
relationships may generate sunk costs, which can give rise to switching costs and “lock-in” problems. 
Finally, releasing pre-contract information to potential buyers may require the company to share valuable 
proprietary information, and increases the risk that competitors will discover its R&D plans (see, also, 
Oxley, 1997). Indeed, Gans et al. (2002) find that start-ups prefer market-based means for profiting from 
innovation when there are mechanisms that help reduce transaction costs.5  
One of the weaknesses of the transaction costs theory in analyzing licensing decisions is its narrow focus 
around isolated transactions (Williamson, 1999: page 1102).  Each transaction is treated as an 
independent item, bearing almost no relationship with previous or future transactions, and with the rest of 
the firm’s activity (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada, 2001). If interaction 
effects are missed or if holistic consequences are glossed over, transaction costs theory would suggest that 
licensing is chosen when the transaction costs of using a market-based mechanism for profiting from 
innovation are sufficiently small (Teece, 1988). However, a licensing agreement might not take place, in 
spite of very low transaction costs, if it does not fit within the firm’s overall strategy. In other words, 
although the transaction is per se profitable, it might have negative effects on other sources of rents that 
outweigh the net profits from the transaction. To sharp this argument further, consider the following 
                                                          
5 A related, but different, impediment to market-based exploitation of technological competencies is due 
to the nature of technological knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
Applying knowledge or technology developed in a specific context for a specific use, to another context 
and use, is rarely simple or straightforward (von Hippel, 1994).  
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simple example: a monopolist in a given product market has got the option to license out its technology 
(likely the source of its competitive advantage) to one or more potential licensees. Even in a Coasian 
world with zero transaction costs, the firm would not typically find a licensing agreement overall 
profitable. Indeed, the presence of another producer (the licensee) in the market would certainly put some 
pressure on the price that will fall below the monopoly level. Unless other reasons are brought in, the firm 
would never be able to earn greater profits under licensing than under no licensing, regardless the actual 
level of transaction costs. Per se the transaction might be well profitable, but striking the deal would 
imply less profits in other parts of the value chain. It is the net balance that matters for deciding whether 
to license or not. This argument suggests that, rather than focusing on economizing at the level of single 
transactions, it is advisable to consider the effects of technology licensing on the whole value chain (i.e. 
economizing at the level of the firm): technology management cannot be performed in isolation from 
other value creating activities, such as production or distribution. 
 
REVENUE EFFECT VERSUS PROFIT DISSIPATION EFFECT 
We develop here a framework that accounts for these subtleties, and will allow us to explain firms’ rate of 
licensing. Our approach does not substitute the extant transaction costs theory, but rather complement it. 
Indeed, we still argue that, other things held constant, smaller transaction costs stimulate licensing. 
Following Arora and Fosfuri (2003), we posit that licensing decisions are the result of the interplay of two 
effects that licensing generates on the licensor’s profits: the profit dissipation effect and the revenue 
effect. The revenue effect is nothing but the present value of the flows of rents accruing to the licensor in 
the form of licensing payments net of all possible transaction costs that bear on the seller of the 
technology. Hence, if BP licenses its Innovene Gas Phase polyethylene process technology to Mitsui for 
an upfront installment of $50 million and an annual royalty fee estimated around $15 million/year, absent 
any transaction costs, the revenue effect amounts to $( ∑
= ++
T
t
tr1 )1(
1550 ) million, where r is the interest 
rate and T is the (expected) length of the licensing contract. It is the revenue effect that firms look for 
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when they strike a licensing deal. Indeed, in the words of Dow’s vice-president“...by both licensing and 
using the technology we could generate more cash...”. The revenue effect is positively related to the 
(gross) profits the licensee can extract from the licensed technology, is negatively related to the amount of 
transaction costs and positively related to the bargaining power of the licensor. Hence, as predicted by the 
transaction costs theory, other things held constant, larger transaction costs imply a smaller revenue effect 
and, in turn, make licensing a less attractive strategy (Teece, 1986). Needless to say that the (gross) 
profits earned by the licensee, transaction costs, and the bargaining power are function of other variables. 
For instance, the licensor’s bargaining power increases with the strength of intellectual property rights 
protection and with the number of suitable licensees.  
The profit dissipation effect is the reduction in the licensor’s profits (i.e. all other profits, but the 
payments from the licensing agreement) that might occur as a consequence of an additional firm 
competing in the product market. Additional competition in the downstream market can both reduce the 
price-cost margin and erode market share. As a result, a licensor, who also competes in the product 
market, might encounter a reduction in the profits it collects from directly producing and commercializing 
the final good. Although the licensor has many different strategies to limit the extent of this latter effect 
(for instance, the contract might impose quantity restrictions or exclusive territories, or unit royalties 
might be set such as to control the licensee’s output), an entrant is nevertheless a potential threat to the 
licensor. To make the argument clearer, consider the simple example discussed above. Assume that BP is 
a major player in the European market for polyethylene with $1 billon net present value profits. By 
licensing its Innovene process technology to Mitsui, BP allows the entry of a new competitor in the 
European market (assume, for simplicity, that Mitsui would not enter the European market without a 
license from BP). Additional competition trims BP net present value profits in the European market for 
polyethylene to $900 million. Hence, the profit dissipation effect of licensing amounts to $100 million. 
The profit dissipation effect depends on several factors: primarily among them, the magnitude of the 
competitive pressure exerted by a new player in the downstream market.  
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The danger of increased competition in the licensor’s own market is echoed by industry players and often 
reported as the main reason for not licensing out. “...For our main chemical products, such as epoxy and 
polyketones, we just don’t want to license them out because it would threaten our market” (a Shell’s 
spokesperson). 
It is the careful comparison between the profit dissipation effect and the revenue effect that explains 
whether a firm is licensing or not, and, if it does, how much it is licensing. 
 
THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY 
To begin with let us consider a situation in which the profit dissipation effect dominates the revenue 
effect. As we discussed above this is typically the case of a monopolist in the product market. Absent any 
threat in the market for technology (i.e. absent any other source for the technology) the firm would 
optimally decide not to license. We are implicitly assuming here that the demand for the final product is 
stable and that the incumbent monopolist has already made the necessary investment to satisfy such 
demand.  Now suppose that another firm has got the technology to produce the final product and can 
potentially license it to an entrant. For the sake of simplicity, assume that this potential licensor cannot 
produce the product itself.  For instance, in the chemical industry, many process technologies are licensed 
by specialized engineering firms, known as SEFs, that do not have any stake in the product market and 
focus their business model around the design, engineering, licensing and, sometimes, construction of 
chemical plants (Arora et al., 2001). Now assume that a potential entrant exists, one who needs a license 
to enter the market. What is the most plausible scenario if the monopolist does not license its technology? 
The potential entrant might strike a deal with the other technology owner and ultimately start to compete 
with the monopolist in the product market. As a result the monopolist might suffer of both eroded market 
share and reduced price-cost margin. Moreover it does not collect any licensing payments since it has 
opted for not licensing its technology. Although this is an oversimplified example, it makes clear the point 
that the presence of competing technologies generates additional incentives to license. The monopolist 
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would have suffered in any case from the profit dissipation effect, but at least it would have benefited 
from the revenue effect, had it licensed out its technology to the potential entrant.  
When there exists a market for technology, as is typically the case for most chemical process 
technologies, a refusal to license by a technology holder will not blockade entry in the product market 
since the prospective licensee can obtain the technology from other potential licensors. Hence, the 
presence of multiple sources for a technology creates a strategic incentive to license.6 However, we do not 
expect the relationship between the rate of licensing and the number of potential technology suppliers to 
be everywhere monotonic. There are at least two arguments that suggest that after a certain threshold the 
rate of licensing might actually decrease in the number of potential technology suppliers. First, the 
number of potential licensees for a given process technology is bounded. Indeed, in some cases, the 
search for suitable licensees turns out to be a long and costly process (Contractor, 1981). If the number of 
potential licensees is fixed (and bounded) and the number of potential licensors keeps increasing, then at a 
certain point the number of effective licenses per licensor will hit the constraint. After that, a further 
increase in the number of licensors produces a reduction in the average number of licenses. Second, a 
larger number of technology suppliers means stronger competition in the market for technology. 
Licensors have weaker bargaining power vis-à-vis the prospective licensees. In other words, the revenue 
effect tends to be competed away when the number of licensors increases. Putting together the different 
arguments we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: There exists an inverted-U shaped relationship between the rate of licensing and the 
number of potential technology suppliers. 
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MARKET SHARE 
To underscore the role of market share in conditioning licensing decisions let us assume that the revenue 
effect is independent of market share, and focus exclusively on the impact of market share on the profit 
dissipation effect.7 As noted before, the profit dissipation effect is the erosion of profits due to additional 
competition in the product market. Hence, we claimed that a technology holder licenses if the net 
licensing revenues are greater than the loss in profits due to increased competition in the product market.  
Although all incumbent producers potentially lose from the increased competition, each licensor only 
internalizes the negative effect on its own profits. This negative effect is smaller, the smaller the profits 
the licensor obtains from direct production prior to licensing. In turn, this implies that, other things equal, 
firms with smaller market shares have stronger incentives to license since they suffer from a much smaller 
profit dissipation effect. A simple way to understand this argument is by fixing the quantity produced by 
each firm and assuming that entry simply reduces the price-cost margin. Firms that sell larger quantities, 
i.e. firms with larger market shares, would suffer the most from competition since the same reduction in 
the margin is multiplied by a higher volume of sales. Firms that center their business model on the pure 
supply of technology with no stakes in the product market, have therefore stronger incentives to license 
than established producers that enjoy large market shares. We can therefore state the following 
hypothesis: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Cesaroni (2003) has studied in details technology licensing by Himont, the joint-venture created in 1983 
between the Italian Montedison and the American Hercules. In the view of Himont’s management, the 
possibility of creating additional competitors in the polypropylene market, from where the firm was 
collecting the largest share of its turnover, was perceived as a clear threat. However, one of the 
determinants of its decision to become a worldwide licensor of its Spheripol process was the presence of 
other potential licensors – such as Union Carbide, Shell and BASF – for polypropylene technology. 
Himont’s management estimated that its refusal to license would have not prevented entry of additional 
competitors, and would have simply reduced the firm’s possibility to capture additional value from its 
R&D investments.    
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HYPOTHESIS 2: The higher the licensor’s share in the product market, the smaller its rate of licensing. 
 
This argument is exemplified by the different ways in which BP Chemicals has approached the acetic acid 
and polyethylene businesses. In acetic acid, BP has strong proprietary technology and a substantial market 
share. It licenses very selectively, typically only granting a license to get access to markets it would 
otherwise be unable to enter. In polyethylene, by contrast, BP’s market share is small. Although it has 
good proprietary technology in polyethylene as well, there are many other sources of technology for 
making polyethylene. Thus, BP has licensed its polyethylene technology aggressively, competing with 
Union Carbide, the market leader in licensing polyethylene technology. 
 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
The role of product differentiation is also better understood by focusing on the profit dissipation effect 
alone. Let us do the following thought experiment. Consider the market for polyethylene and assume that 
Mitsui, with its own proprietary technology, competes in the downstream market with several other 
producers. Assume that Mitsui has a 2% market share. Let us start with the case in which the final 
product, polyethylene, is perfectly homogenous across all producers. Mitsui is a small player and, as we 
argued above, would not suffer too much of a loss if an additional firm steps in and starts producing 
polyethylene. Hence, the profit dissipation effect for Mitsui is rather small and might well be smaller than 
the revenue effect. Mitsui might have strong incentives to license. Indeed, even if Mitsui has got a good 
proprietary technology, it might be difficult for the firm to gain a larger share of the polyethylene market. 
Licensing is a quick and rather riskless alternative for accomplishing this task. Now, consider the opposite 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 The relationship between market share and the revenue effect is ambiguous a priori. Bigger players, with 
larger market shares, might enjoy stronger bargaining power in licensing negotiations. However, 
prospective licensees might be reluctant to buy the technology from a large well established competitor. 
Indeed, the presence of a large competitor might reduce the licensees’ expectations of future profits and, 
hence, their willingness to pay for the technology. However, we believe that these are second order 
effects that can be safely ignored. 
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situation in which each producer has a well-defined market niche. In other words, the polyethylene 
market is highly differentiated and each firm is producing its own no easily substitutable variety. 
Although Mitsui is a small player in the overall polyethylene market, it is almost a monopolist in its 
niche. Licensing would create much stronger competition now, since Mitsui would allow the entry of 
another firm producing exactly the same variety. In this case the profit dissipation effect is much larger 
and the firm might not find profitable to license. In addition, other technology suppliers are less of a threat 
since, even if they license, they would not allow direct entry into Mitsui’s own market niche. An implicit 
assumption of this argument is that Mitsui’s technology would produce indistinguishable varieties of 
polyethylene if exploited by other firms (licensees). So, product differentiation is due to differences in the 
process technology rather than to simple branding. This in turn fits quite well with most chemical 
products in our database – like ammonia, acetic acid, polypropylene – where the major source of 
differentiation is due to the technology (type of catalyst, temperature, feedstock, etc.) rather than the firm. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The higher the degree of product differentiation, the smaller the firm’s rate of 
licensing. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
We hypothesize that the rate of licensing is generated by the following function y=f(x,β) where y is 
licensing counts, x is a vector of explanatory variables that includes the ones identified in our hypotheses 
above (plus all available control variables), and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Since the 
dependent variable is discrete, non-negative, with numerous zero entries, conventional linear regression 
models are, thus, inappropriate. The simplest model form to accommodate count data is the Poisson 
Regression Model. To guarantee non-negativity of λ, we model the single parameter of the Poisson 
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distribution function, λ, as )exp(][ βλ xyE == . We estimate our parameters by maximum likelihood 
(Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). 
The assumption that the dependent variable is distributed Poisson is quite strong. It implies that the mean 
of the distribution is equal to its variance. If such property is violated, although the parameters will be 
consistently estimated, their standard errors will typically be underestimated, leading to spuriously high 
levels of significance. Empirically, it is not uncommon to find that the conditional variance is larger than 
the conditional mean, implying over dispersion. For instance, this might be caused by the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. To address this problem we use a negative binomial regression, which 
provides more efficient estimators (Hausman et al., 1984). 
Another econometric concern is the large number of zero observations (about 80%). These zero 
observations stand for cases in which a firm, that could potentially license its technology, has decided not 
to do it. This implies that we should be concerned about the censored distribution of the dependent 
variable. As a robustness check we estimate an equation using a Tobit regression. A brief discussion of an 
alternative, more sophisticated methodology is also provided. 
 
Our data on licensing come from Chemintell (1997), a commercial data base compiled by Chemical 
Intelligence Services (Chem-Intell), a division of Reed Telepublishing Ltd, a member of the Reed 
Elsevier Plc Group.8 Chemintell provides information on over 36,000 plants announced or constructed all 
over the world in the broadly defined chemical sector during 1980-1996. Although incomplete, it also 
reports information on plants built prior to 1980. The database is organized by plants. It reports the name 
of the company that ordered the plant, the name of the licensor for that plant (or ‘staff’ for in-house 
licensing), the location of the plant (city and country), the name of the chemical process or of the product 
being produced, the date in which the investment was first reported in the specialized trade press, along 
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with other information. For about 40% of the plants, Chemintell also reports the total cost of investment 
in the plant in US million dollars, and for a larger share of the plants it shows the actual or planned 
capacity.  
To test our hypotheses, we will focus on a sample of large chemical firms. These firms are all chemical 
firms from developed countries (Western Europe, USA and Canada, and Japan) that had, by the year 
1988, more than $1 billion in aggregate sales (Aftalion, 1991). Of this set of firms only 153 had at least 
one plant scored in Chemintell. These are the firms we used in our study. By nationality, we have 67 US 
firms, 1 Canadian firm, 32 Japanese and 53 European firms. (The whole list of firms is available upon 
request.) We restricted our attention to this sample of large firms because we had to collect firm-specific 
variables that our database did not provide. Moreover, the focus of this paper is on the licensing strategies 
of large corporations, which more strongly face the tradeoff between revenue effect and profit dissipation 
effect.  Therefore, the licensing activity of specialized technology suppliers, small firms and start-ups is 
left out from our study. 
Among all possible chemical products in our database (about 3,000) we have selected a sample of 139 
products for which we could reasonably collect additional information (notably, patents). This sample 
includes all the most important products in our data set (in terms of worldwide investment) and accounts 
for more than half of all plants in Chemintell. For instance, “ammonia” and “acetic acid” are two 
examples of such products. A full list of products along with their classification in chemical sub-sectors is 
available upon request. 
As a first step we need to identify the firms that possess technological capabilities in a given product, and 
that can therefore license to others. Then, we look at the licensing behavior of these firms. Obviously, 
these firms change across different products. The set of potential licensors of ammonia process 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Full access to the Chemintell database was bought in November 1997 with financial support of the 
European Union through the TSER Programme Contract SOE1-CT97-1059. Chem-Intell maintains the 
database by regularly monitoring a comprehensive range of publications worldwide in most European 
languages. 
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technology is different from the set of potential licensors of acetic acid process technology, although the 
two sets might overlap. 
To address this issue we exploited the richness of our data set. We split the data in two time periods: 
1980-85 and 1986-1996.  We used the first time period to identify which of our 153 firms possessed 
technological capabilities in any of our 139 products. As a criterion we used the fact that the firm in 
question had either licensed the technology or built in-house a plant using its own technology. As a 
sensitive check we have also considered a different time break:  1980-87 and 1988-96. We have also 
experimented with a more demanding criterion: two plants instead of just one. Qualitative results do not 
change. For some products we have identified no potential licensors, so we have dropped them from our 
sample (about 20%). For other we have identified a fairly large group of potential licensors, confirming 
that the threat of competition in the market for technology is a real one in the chemical industry. It is 
important to remind the reader that we are looking at the licensors for the process technology used to 
fabricate a given chemical product. Finally, we used our second time period to look at the licensing 
behavior of these potential licensors.  
Since our data set covers investment in chemical plants worldwide we have divided the world in seven 
geographical areas: Africa, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, South America, Middle 
East and South East Asia. It is quite clear that licensing in France would create a much stronger 
competitive pressure in Western Europe than in North America or South East Asia. A firm with a large 
stake in the downstream market in North America, but a smaller one in Western Europe would suffer 
from a larger profit dissipation effect if it licenses in the former geographical area rather than in the latter.  
To summarize, we will look at the rate of licensing of large chemical firms (indexed by i), in a set of 
product markets that are defined around chemical products (indexed by j) and geographical areas (indexed 
by k). 
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VARIABLES 
Rate of licensing.  The number of licensed plants by firm i, in product j, and geographical area k. The 
count is done over the period 1986-1996. As discussed above only a small subset of our 153 firms have 
technological competencies in any given product j. Moreover this subset tends to change for each product.  
Potential licensors. We want to capture the presence of other sources of technological competencies.  In 
other words, we would like to know how many other firms are capable to supply the process for 
producing product j.  We do so by counting the number of firms (excluding firm i) that have licensed a 
given process technology for producing product j in the period  1980-1985.  This is a good proxy for the 
number of potential licensors of that technology in the period 1986-1996.  It is plausible that this measure 
varies across geographical areas. The set of potential technology suppliers for polyethylene process 
technology in North America might differ from the set of potential technology suppliers in South East 
Asia.  For instance, there might exist geographic idiosyncrasies that make a technology suitable for the 
economic, legal and environmental conditions of one area, but unsuitable for another. We have estimated 
our regressions with the number of potential licensors varying both across j and across jk (although, to 
save space, we only show the latter). Qualitative results do not change. 
Market share. We compute the market share of firm i, in product j and geographical area k as the ratio 
between the capacity built by firm i in jk and the total capacity in jk. Unfortunately, Chemintell is silent 
about the extent of capacity utilization. 
Product differentiation. Chemintell does not provide any direct measure of product differentiation at the 
level of the product j. To operationalize this variable we use three different proxies. The first one is a 
measure of product differentiation computed at the sub-sector level. Chemintell classifies all products in 
23 sub-sectors. Hence, our first measure of product differentiation only varies across these 23 sub-sectors. 
We use plant counts at the product level to compute an equidistribution index at the sub-sector level 
(Sutton, 1991).  Our index of product differentiation takes the value of 0 if the sub-sector has 
homogenous products and the value of 100 if the products are totally differentiated. Our second measure 
of product differentiation is computed at the product level by using patents accounts. We counted the total 
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number of patents reported for a given product (for instance, polyethylene) at the US Patent Office during 
the 1976-1995 period. This number includes all patents concerning different uses, product and end-use 
applications, multiple inputs, and components for any given product j.  It is both a measure of the 
technological complexity of a given product j and of the extent of potential applications and uses. This is 
our second proxy for product differentiation. The larger is this number the more differentiated is the 
product. Our third proxy of product differentiation is the average cost in US dollars per unit of capacity 
installed in each product j. We expect that more homogeneous and basic products are produced in large 
scale plants whose cost per unit of capacity installed is lower. By contrast, more differentiated and 
sophisticated products are produced in small size plants and tend to have, on average, a larger cost per 
unit of capacity installed. Hence, the higher the cost per unit of capacity installed the more differentiated 
is the product.  
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Demand growth. This variable measures the growth potential in the demand for chemical plants in 
product j and geographical area k. We use the ratio between the total number of plants constructed in 
technology j and geographical area k during the period 1986-1991 and the period 1980-1985. We expect 
to observe a positive relationship between the rate of licensing and demand growth since a rising demand 
relaxes the negative effect on the licensor’s profits due to increased competition. 
Potential licensees. The larger the number of potential licensees, the stronger the bargaining power of the 
licensor and, hence, the larger the revenue effect from licensing. Indeed, Contractor (1981) points out 
that, in some cases, the search for suitable licensees turns out to be a long and costly process. Hence, we 
posit a positive relationship between the rate of licensing and the number of potential licensees. The 
number of potential licensees is computed as the number of downstream chemical producers active in 
product j and geographical market k.  
Aggregate sales.  We include this variable to control for the effect of firm size on the rate of licensing. 
For instance, larger firms might have stronger bargaining power in the licensing negotiations or they 
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might have better options to profit from their technological competences. We use the aggregate sales of 
firm i in 1988 (Aftalion, 1991). 
R&D. For each firm i, R&D captures total R&D expenditures in 1988 (Aftalion, 1991). The sign of this 
variable is not theoretically clear a priori. Higher R&D intensity means that the firm is more likely to 
possess valuable technological assets to license out. On the other hand, firms tend to avoid giving away 
their state-of-the-art technology and typically prefer to license older vintage technologies. However, the 
reason for including this variable, as well as aggregate sales, is to control for firm-specific sources of 
variation that might affect the rate of licensing. 
Japanese. A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the licensor is a Japanese firm. Japanese firms 
have a long tradition of being quite skeptical about licensing out their technology. 
American. A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the licensor is an American firm. American 
firms have been traditionally active licensors of technology. 
Core competence. For each firm i, this variable measures the amount of the investment in product j 
relative to the firm’s overall investment. It is a proxy for how relevant or core is product j for firm i. We 
want to see if firms tend to license core or peripheral technologies.   
Experience. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i has already experience in 
technology licensing in product j and geographical area k. Experience in gathering information about 
prospective licensees, negotiating, writing contracts and enforcing them lowers the cost of licensing. 
Experience is therefore a good proxy for the transaction costs of licensing. We posit that experience, by 
reducing transaction costs, makes licensing a more appealing strategy.  
Dummy variables for geographical areas. This set of dummy variables is meant to control for sources of 
heterogeneity across locations. For instance, some areas might have better conditions for technology 
licensing like stronger intellectual property rights or better access to related technological services that 
make easier the transaction.  
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the dependent, independent, and 
control variables. 
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the results of our estimations. Our preferred model is the Negative Binomial estimation, 
but, as one can see, the sign of the parameters is stable across all different regressions. The only 
difference between Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 is that in the first we use our proxy of product 
differentiation computed at the sub-sector level, in the second we use our proxy of product differentiation 
based on patents accounts and in the third we use our proxy of product differentiation based on the 
average cost per unit of capacity installed.  
The number of observations is 1754. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the rate of licensing is first increasing and 
then decreasing in the number of potential technology suppliers. To test this hypothesis we add a square 
term to the number of potential licensors. If our hypothesis is correct, then one should obtain a positive 
coefficient for the number of potential licensor and a negative coefficient for the square term. The 
parameter estimate for the number of potential licensors is positive and highly significant in all 
specifications reported in Table 2. We also find a negative and significant coefficient for the square term, 
suggesting that the relationship between the rate of licensing and the number of technology suppliers 
displays an inverted-U shape. For instance, by using Model 1 of the Negative Binomial estimation one 
can show that the inflection point is around 6 (notice that the number of potential licensors varies between 
0 and 17 with an average of about 3). If all other variables are kept at their mean value, a standard 
deviation increase in the number of potential licensors would imply an increment in the rate of licensing 
of about 13%. Figure 1 shows the predicted rate of licensing as a function of the number of potential 
licensors. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms license more in product markets where they have smaller market shares. 
Indeed, as we argued above, the profit dissipation effect is positively correlated to market share. The sign 
of the parameter estimate for market share is negative in all regressions and highly significant.  If all other 
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variables are kept at their mean value, a standard deviation increase in market share would reduce the rate 
of licensing by more than 40%. 
As an additional extension of our theory, one can conjecture that the importance of market share might 
depend on the presence of other potential licensors. Indeed, even if a firm with a large market share 
decides not to license in order to restrict entry, its effort would not produce the desired result if the 
prospective investors/licensees can resort to other providers for the technology. So, the impact of market 
share on the rate of licensing might depend on the existence or not of a well-established market for that 
given technology. For instance, BP, one of the major producer and licensor of polyethylene, had initially 
tried not to license its polyethylene technology in Western Europe, where it had a substantial share of 
polyethylene capacity. However, other licensors continued to supply technology to firms that wished to 
produce polyethylene in Western Europe, with the result that BP found it was losing potential licensing 
revenues without any benefits in the form of restraining entry. As a response, the firm started to actively 
license its technology to potential entrants. We have explored this possibility by separating the effect of 
market share between the case in which there were no other potential licensors and the case in which there 
were alternative sources for the technology. As expected the coefficient of market share is larger in the 
former case than in the latter, but the difference is not statistically significant. Results of these regressions 
are reported in Table 3. We have also experimented with an interaction term between the number of 
potential licensors and market share. Although the coefficient of the interaction term had a positive sign it 
was not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that firms show a higher rate of licensing when the product market is sufficiently 
homogenous. We used three different proxies to capture the degree of product differentiation. All are 
consistently negative in our estimations suggesting that licensing is less likely to occur in differentiated 
product market. These findings seem to support Hypothesis 3. Keeping all other variables at their mean 
value, a standard deviation increase in the degree of product differentiation would reduce the rate of 
licensing by between 35% and 48% (depending on the proxy we use). 
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The signs of the other variables are reasonable.  Particularly interesting is the positive and highly 
significant coefficient of the number of potential licensees in a given product market jk. A larger number 
of licensees means greater bargaining power for the licensor. It also means that it is much more likely to 
find a licensee who better suits the idiosyncrasies of the licensor’s technology. In turn, this implies that 
the value generated from the transaction is higher making licensing a more appealing option. Concerning 
transaction costs, the findings seem to support the idea that higher transaction costs reduce the rate of 
licensing. Indeed, our dummy for experience in licensing in product j and geographical area k is positive 
and highly significant.  Demand growth has the positive expected sign, significant in all regressions. Our 
measure of firm size is positive, whereas R&D is negative, implying that larger firms with less R&D 
intensity have a higher rate of licensing. Japanese firms and American firms are respectively less and 
more active licensors than their European counterparts, although these findings are not statistically 
significant. Finally, firms tend to license  more technologies that are core to their overall product 
portfolio. It is less likely that they license peripheral or orphan technologies.  
As we discussed in the previous section, one important econometric concern is the presence of a large 
number of zeros in our dependent variable (about 80%). We have controlled for this potential problem 
through a Tobit specification. An alternative, more sophisticated methodology is a zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression (Greene, 2000). A zero-inflated negative binomial model, also known as hurdle 
model, assumes that the zeros are generated by a different process than the remaining counts. A binary 
probability model determines whether a zero or a nonzero outcome occurs, then, in the latter case, a 
(truncated) negative binomial distribution describes the positive outcomes. All our explanatory variables 
have been used in the regression. Results, available from the author upon request, remain qualitatively 
unchanged. A positive Vuong test shows that the inflated model performs slightly better than the standard 
negative binomial model. 
 [TABLE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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6. CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
There is increasing evidence that firms in some sectors are looking to profit from their intellectual 
property not just by embodying it in their own output but also by licensing their intellectual property to 
others, including potential competitors.  Licensing does, however, entail a trade-off: licensing revenues 
have to be balanced against the lower price-cost margin and/or reduced market share that the increased 
competition from the licensees implies. In this paper we argued that competition in the market for 
technology might trigger a more aggressive behavior by potential licensors. The tradeoff between profit 
dissipation effect and revenue effect that normally guides licensing decisions should be adjusted for the 
presence of rival licensors. In particular, when there are multiple technology holders, not only do they 
compete in the product market, they also compete in the market for technology. Since licensing partially 
substitutes for production, firms lacking adequate downstream commercialization (production and 
marketing) capabilities are naturally more aggressive licensors. Moreover, we have argued that increasing 
product differentiation not only softens price competition in the product market, it also reduces the rate of 
licensing in the technology market. 
We tested this framework using an extensive dataset on worldwide investment in chemical plants. We 
looked at licensing strategies by a sample of large chemical producers in more than 100 products. Our 
results suggest that the presence of a market for technology plays a crucial role in creating incentives for a 
more proactive licensing behavior. Firms, that normally would have not licensed their intellectual 
property, might be forced to do so, because of the competitive pressure in the market for technology. 
Two contributions are particularly worth emphasizing here. First, this research underscores the crucial 
role played by the presence of a market for technology in shaping firms’ licensing strategy. This has 
implications both for the literature that has addressed the rationales behind firms’ licensing (Gallini, 1984; 
Rockett, 1990; Anand and Khanna, 2000) and for the literature on innovation and technology exploitation 
(Teece, 1986; Hsu, et al., 2002). In the former case our paper suggests that in some industries it might be 
problematic, if not wrong, to analyze firms’ licensing strategy in isolation, abstracting from product and 
technology market dynamics. Indeed, most of this literature has assumed that the licensor is a monopolist 
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technology holder, and this implies setting apart the analysis of all potential interesting interactions in the 
market for technology. In the latter case our paper offers an approach that is better suited to understand 
firm’s rate of licensing than the extant transaction costs framework. Second, our paper provides one of the 
few large scale study of the determinants of the rate of licensing. This is particularly valuable in light of 
the recent trend towards a more widespread use of licensing agreements for the exploitation of the firm’s 
intellectual property. 
Our study has several limitations. From an empirical point of view, since we did not have firms’ market 
shares back in the mid 80s we had to reconstruct them using the information on capacity investment 
provided by our database. Although correlated, installed capacity might not always be a good proxy for 
market share. More serious is the lack of an appropriate measure of product differentiation. Ideally, this 
measure should capture how different is the product produced with the process technology of a firm vis-à-
vis those produced with the technologies of other potential licensors. In this case, our empirical analysis 
could benefit from additional data collection, which might require an in-depth analysis of all process 
technologies available for each of our 139 products. From a theoretically point of view our framework 
would clearly benefit from a deeper integration of our strategic positioning approach with the transaction 
costs approach. Ideally, one should be able to predict simultaneously the choice of the governance 
structure and the extent to which each governance structure is used. We are confident that we will be able 
to uncover most of these shortcomings in future developments of this line of research. Finally, as far as it 
concerns the generality of our findings one could easily contend that they are idiosyncratic to the 
chemical industry. As a partial defense to our work, we could point to the empirical evidence that has 
shown that industries with large licensing activity, i.e. electronics, biotechnology, semiconductors, are 
also those that have sufficiently well functioning markets for technology (Arora, et al., 2001). However, 
only future research would be able to prove whether our findings are industry specific or more generally 
applicable. 
From a more applied point of view, our study suggests that firms that wish to exploit licensing 
opportunities have to ensure that the tradeoff between licensing revenues and rent dissipation is well 
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managed. This requires educating business managers about the net value added from sale of products 
versus that from licensing. Licensing revenues are rarely comparable to the revenues from sales of 
products, but the cost of generating a dollar of licensing revenues is significantly lower than the cost of 
generating a dollar of product sales. Further, it requires that managers have incentives consistent with 
those of the firm as a whole. Managers who are rewarded for sales growth or market share will tend to 
overlook licensing opportunities. 
A final cautionary remark is needed. The recent enthusiasm by many industry practitioners and 
independent consultants about the virtue of licensing might, in some cases, be misplaced. Licensing, 
especially when triggered by the presence of a market for technology, is a double-edged sword. Although 
some firms might benefit from aggressive licensing, the final outcome is likely to be increased 
competition in the product market and less overall industry profits. Attempts to implicitly or explicitly 
collude in the licensing market, which are relatively common in the chemical industry, confirm the 
relevance of this remark.  
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
VARIABLE Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Rate of licensing 0.323 1.123              
2. Potential licensors 3.139 3.292 0.24             
3. Market share 0.029 0.085 -0.01 -0.08            
4a. Prod. Diff.: Sub-
sector Index 
21.046 7.241 -0.09 -0.18 -0.02           
4b. Prod. Diff.: Patents 813.9 1642 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.18          
4c. Prod. Diff.: Cost per 
unit of capacity 
12.42 36.94 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.61 0.45         
5. Demand growth 1.532 1.737 0.09 0.13 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04        
6. Potential licensees 12.94 13.52 0.27 0.74 -0.03 0.05 0.26 0.27 0.08       
7. Aggregate sales 10011* 6430 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03      
8. R&D 555.8* 390.7 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.89     
9. Japanese 0.078 0.268 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.24 -0.22    
10. American 0.378 0.485 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.13 -0.23   
11. Core competence 0.039 0.088 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.39 0.47 -0.01 0.28 -0.21 -0.14 -0.04 -0.01  
12. Experience 0.343 0.475 0.39 0.30 0.31 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.05 
* In millions of US dollars. 
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TABLE 2: RATE OF LICENSING BY FIRM I IN PRODUCT J AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA K 
 
 Negative Binomial Poisson Tobit 
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
 
-4.685*** -5.630*** -5.546*** -4.866*** -5.557*** -5.491*** -7.654*** -9.265*** -9.098*** 
Potential licensors  0.137** 0.137** 0.123** 0.154*** 0.134** 0.130*** 0.211* 0.197* 0.157 
Square term -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.018** -0.016** -0.018** 
Market share -7.064*** -6.604*** -7.226*** -6.288*** -5.791*** -6.468*** -13.551*** -12.853*** -14.063*** 
          
Product Differentiation          
   Sub-sector Index -0.047***   -0.038***   -0.084***   
   Patents  -0.0002***   -0.0004***   -0.0008***  
   Cost unit of capacity   -0.018***   -0.017***   -0.037*** 
 
Controls: 
         
 
Demand growth 
 
0.103*** 
 
0.090** 
 
0.091** 
 
0.089*** 
 
0.079*** 
 
0.084*** 
 
0.217*** 
 
0.197*** 
 
0.197*** 
Potential licensees 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.062** 0.069*** 
Aggregate sales 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
R&D -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**** -0.001* 
Japanese -0.180 -0.338 -0.273 -0.388* -0.489** -0.453** 0.022 -0.294 -0.134 
American 0.263* 0.193 0.248* 0.271*** 0.224** 0.267** 0.574* 0.487 0.632** 
Core competence 1.430* 3.629*** 2.612*** 1.075** 3.348*** 1.766*** 3.382** 7.542 5.807*** 
Experience 4.352*** 4.372*** 4.307*** 4.341*** 4.371*** 4.300*** 6.594*** 6.580*** 6.414*** 
          
Dummy variables for 
geographical areas 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
          
Number of obs. 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 
Log Likelihood -774 -776 -769 -874 -869 -858 -862 -860 -854 
Chi-squared 656 652 666 1432 1442 1466 633 637 650 
          
* p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 3: RATE OF LICENSING BY FIRM I IN PRODUCT J AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA K 
 
Variables Negative Binomial 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Constant 
 
-4.682*** -5.612*** -5.531*** 
Potential licensors  0.133** 0.129** 0.115** 
Square term -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
Market share*(1 – DUMjk) -8,027*** -8.220*** -8.789*** 
Market share*DUMjk -6.855*** -6.253*** -6.885*** 
    
Product Differentiation    
   Sub-sector Index -0.047***   
   Patents  -0.0003***  
   Cost unit of capacity   -0.018*** 
 
Controls: 
   
 
Demand growth 
 
0.102*** 
 
0.089** 
 
0.090** 
Potential licensees 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 
Aggregate sales 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
R&D -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
Japanese -0.175 -0.329 -0.264 
American 0.268* 0.202 0.256* 
Core competence 1.399* 3.573*** 2.543*** 
Experience 4.353*** 4.372*** 4.310*** 
    
Dummy variables for 
geographical areas 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
    
Number of obs. 1754 1754 1754 
Log Likelihood -774 -776 -769 
Chi-squared 656 652 666 
    
* p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. DUMjk is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
number of potential licensors is positive and zero otherwise. 
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FIGURE 1: PREDICTED RATE OF LICENSING AND THE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL LICENSORS 
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